Our judgments of others are often based on words. Reflecting this, traic-adjectives most commonly provide the source of information in person perception research. Two different meanings may be ascribed to these words: evaluative and denotative. Honest, for example, is evaluatively positive, and denotes a lack of deceit. In most person perception research, evaluative judgments of word sets describing a stimulus person are elicited, and component words are selected for their position of this evaluative dimension.
When judges are asked to evaluate likableness of a single word, evaluative meaning of that word appears to shift with the context of other traits attributed to the stimulus person. Evaluation of a word will be more positive if it is embedded in a set of positive words, and more negative if appearing with negative words, compared to out-ofcontext evaluations. Context effects are well established in person perception (Anderson, 1971; Asch, 1946; Kaplan, 1971a; Wyer & Watson, 1969) , but the mediating processes remain a controversial issue.
One interpretation invokes the mediation of denotative meanings. According to the meaning-change formulation (Asch, 1946 ; see also restatements by Ostrom, 1974; and Wyer, 1974) , the test words undergo a change in denotative meaning to conform to context S. denotations. This occurs via the selection of word meanings, from the universe of CT" potential denotative associates for the word, which are most congruous with the context.
OThe evaluative meaning assigned to the word is determined by the valence of the selected denotations. gr VInformation integration theory (Anderson, 1971) firnishes the second major explanation. __ a.
It proposes that evaluative judgments are based on the evaluative components of the Consider now the denotative relationship between the test and context words.
Comparing contexts of similar value, meaning change predicts greater effects for a context denoting a particular aspect of the trait than for one denoting unrelated aspects. Kaplan (1971a, Exp. I ) and will be briefly described here. Twenty-four experimental sets were constructed according to a 2x2x2x3 matrix, with two levels of test word likableness (moderately positive/moderately negative), two levels of test word variability in normative evaluative ratings, two levels of context word likableness (highly positive/highly negative) and three set-sizes of context (1, 3. or 5 traits).
Likableness was determined by reference to Anderson's (1968) trait-adjective norms. The 2x2 matrix of test words was randomly paire,1 with either 1, 3, or 5 context words at each likableness level to complete the design. Selection of traits from the normative list, whether test or context, was without replacement, so that no word appeared more than once in the experiment. Twelve filler sets were added, composed of uniformly high or low likableness words, two sets of each size. Sets were presented in random order, preceded by 6 practice sets, which spanned the range of likableness.
For each test word, two eight-point bipolar semantic scales were constructed. The first, similar to Hamilton and Zanna (1974) , had endpoints representing positive and negative denotations of the test word. For the test word dependent, for example, trusting and helpless give the positive and negative scalar endpoints, respectively. she second scale was anchored by positive and negative words implicationally unrelated to either the test word or the particular context in which it appeared. For example, careful and overmeticulous give unrelated scalar endpoints for dependent. Care was taken to equate the endpoints within each pair of scales for evaluative likableness, according to Anderson's (1968) norms.
Procedure
Similar to Hamilton and Zanna (1974) , subjects first rated the likableness of the stimulus person on a seven -point scale (1 = Dislike very much, 7 se Like very much).
Then subjects rated the extent to which the test word meant one or the other of the per of traits in both semantic scales. For each of the 42 stimulus sets, order of related and unrelated scales was random.
The six practice sets were given first, followed by the 36 experimental and filler sets, in the same randomized order for all subjects. Stimuli were projected via slides in group sessions, with approximately 10 subjects to a session.
Subjects
Twenty male and 23 female undergraduates, enrolled in an introductory psychology course, served as volunteer subjects, earning extra credit in the course for participation.
Results

Test word ratings
Mean ratings on the test word related and unrelated scales are presented in The Variability x Context interaction was insignificant for both scales (F's = .00, 1.39, df = 1/42, for related and unrelated scales, respectively) indicating that the context effect was similar at both levels of test word varibility. While of some interest with regard to the meaning change formulation, this finding is peripheral to this paper and will not be discussed further. Moderately positive (M+) and moderately negative (M-) words, 11 of each, were selected from Anderson's (1968) norms. Test words were subsequently selected from these subsets to conform to experimental requirements. For each word, eight highly positive (H) and eight highly negative (L) words v;re chosen so that some II and L words might be denotatively related, and others denotatively unrelated, to their respective M+ or M-word. Subjects first rated the person described by a set, on a 7 point likableness scale, ani then rated the test word on a 21 point scale (0 = Dislike very much, 20 = Like very much).
Each subject rated only one of the experimental replications, giving a 2x2x2x4 factorial design, with test or context word likableness, and test -con ..ext relatedness as within-subject factors, and replications as a between-subject factor.
Subjects
Forty I,nderraduates in an introductory psychology course, half of each sex, served as volunteer subjects, earning extra credit for participation. Ten subjects served in each stimulus replication condition.
Results
Test Word Ratings
Test word likableness ratings, collapsed across replications, are given in Table 2 .
While a main effect appeared for replications, as well as an interaction with test words, these were considered uninterpretable since it had not been possible to equate test or context word values across replications.
Test words were rated lower ia likableness in an L context compared to an H context, and this was true for both M+ and M-words. This uniform context effect is supported in ANOVA by a significant effect for context (F = 12.64, df = 1/36, p< .005) and the absence of a Test x Context interaction (F<1).
The effect of denotative relatedness of test and context was central to this experiment. Degree of relatedness had no effect upon the magnitude of context effects.
Within context levels, the mean responses to high related and low related contexts were almost identical. The test of this observation lies in the Context x Relatedness interaction, which was negligible (F<1). The only effect for relatedness appeared in a non-significant interaction with Test words (F = 3.79, df = 1/36, p <.10) whereby the difference between ratings of M+ and M-words, regardlesri of context, likableness was greater in high related contexts, compared to low related. The source of this interaction is unclear, as are its' implications for context-induced meaning change.
Insert Table 2 here
Person Ratings Significant Context (F .., 237.33, df = 1/36, p< .001) and Test Word (F = 13.95, df = 1/36, p <.001) effects were observed for person ratings. This is not surprising; it reflects the fact that ratings of persons will be more positive if either the test or context word is more positive. The effect of context, however, was greater for sets in which the context was implicationally unrelated to the test (Interaction F = 4.85, df = 1/36, p< .05). That responses were more extreme for implicationally unrelated sets is consistent with the redundancy effect (Kaplan, 1971b Evaluative context effects appear not to involve a meaning selection process, nor are they mediated by denotative changes. Instead, evaluative components of trait meaning appear crucial. The simple generalization may be made that judgments are based on meaning components relevant to the judgment dimension. In a similar vein, Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan (1968) and Hamilton & Fallot (1974) have shown that a given trait will influence judgment to the extent that both trait and judgment fall on the same dimension. If a test trait is evaluated, this dimensional relevance principle suggests that the evaluative meaning of context traits would be the locus of context effects.
Person perceptions are not always totally evaluative. In some judgments, particularly those calling for a denotative implication of the information, denotative meaning of stinuli would be important. In the present data (Experiment 1) the effect of the context was greater for scales denotatively related to the trait word, compared to unrelated scales (see Fig. 1 ). An analysis of variance, treating response scales as an independent variable, gives a significant F-ratio cf 44.77 for scale (df = 1/42, p <.001).
Thus, in a task containing both descriptive and evaluative elements (e.g., studies of trait implication) it is proper to ask for the relative contribution of evaluative and denotative meaning. It should be noted, however, that even where the task is apparently descriptive, evaluative halo influences are powerful (see also Rosenberg and Olshan, 1370) .
The relative influence of evaluative and denotative properties in person perception has been at issue in stud.Les of trait implications. The label "implicit personality theories" is frequently applied to the consistencies uncovered in jvAialug the existence of traits from given traits. It is a matter of contention whether descriptive or evaluative pzoperties are predominant in determining such trait relationships (Felipe, 1970; Lay & Jackson, 1969; Peabody, 1970; Rosenberg & Olshan, 1970) , but there is evidence that the extent of either influence depends on task requirements (Felipe, 1970; Peabody, 1970) , and on familiarity with the stimulus person (Schneider, 1973) . For example, in the resolution of simultaneous evaluative and descriptive inconsistencies, evaluative differences dominate when subjects make evaluative judgments (Kaplan, 1973) , but descriptive influences are primary where extrapolations to descriptively related traits are required (Peabody, 1970) . Evaluative halos appear pervasive in many judgment tasks; descriptive or aenotative meaning has more limited importance. The importance of denotative meaning as a mediator of evaluative context effects has yet to be systematically demonstrated. 
